barrio flores

I'm, not surprisingly, somewhat skeptical of the current (if not the previous) protests against American involvement in Latin American military affairs.

First, the fact that many SOA grads went on to become dictators isn't so much an indictment of the SOA, as it is an example of who was sent to SOA. Militaries enjoy sending officers overseas to learn from "better" militaries (before 1945, that meant either France, Britain, or Germany). Those who attended SOA went there *because* they would some day rise in the ranks. Since military governments were (until the 1980s) the norm in Latin America for two centuries, blaming military regimes of the 60s and 70s on SOA is problematic.

Second, some relationship between US & Latin American militaries is necessary, if they are to have regional alliances (since the OAS & Rio Pacts call for them). That requires that at least some officers from LA get upper echelon training w/ US forces, tactical doctrine, and equipment.

Third, the key problem of maintaining democracy in LA is the issue of civilian control over the military. The US military (as an institutiton) has one of the world's best records of subservience to civilian authority. If any military can teach soldiers the importance of political neutrality, I think US officers can.

Fourth, LA militaries *will* send their officers *somewhere* for training. Where would we rather they go?

It's hard to prove a cause-and-effect relationship. Certainly the officers didn't arrive at Ft. Benning as angels, and left as savages. It also isn't a matter of what they teach (although there have been exposed manuals that teach psychological operations, that border on torture). It is a question of what they don't teach them.

Judging from the interviews, it is obvious that they look up to the Americans, with their fancy weapons, advanced technology and intelligence operations. The students now see themselves as a part of a country where there is more order and thought to be more "advanced."

There is a huge opportunity to try and reverse the idea that everything is black-and-white. Yet, the Americans try to paint everything in that manner. It has been proven that Latin American military, supported and encouraged by the U.S., seem to make no distinction between criminals, rebel groups, civilians and other groups that fight for human rights (Catholic priests and other human rights groups).

There is a certain amount of tactics that the United States turn a blind eye on. As long as they are making progress towards their goals, then those things are tolerated.

The very first time that some connection and repeat patterns came up, maybe the U.S. should have asked themselves what they weren’t teaching these soldiers.

I agree that the institution of the military is drastically different in Bolivia, than in the U.S. In Bolivia, the Armed Forces frequently chime in on their stance on certain issues, such as when they said that autonomies should be addressed in the Constituent Assembly.

The SOA is just a small part of the whole picture, concerning U.S. involvement in Latin America and the structure of the military in Latin America.

Part of the problem, stems from differences in how militaries are employed in the US v. Latin America.

The US military are almost never used as a "police" force domestically; it's exclusively held for use as a "military" force in foreign theaters. Those rare ocassions when the National Guard comes out, are only when it's a national or state emergency, very infrequently. It's the opposite in Latin America, where militaries are used as "police" forces domestically, often instead of police forces altogether. This requires an entirely different kind of training altogether. Think of the different kids of rules-of-engagement training natural to military (aggressive) v. police forces (defensive).

Another problem I have w/ criticisms of the SOA, is that we seldom compare its training & graduates w/ an equivalent -- third world officers who went to the USSR for similar training programs. Many of those graduates ended up as horrible human rights abusers in Nicaragua, Cuba, FARC, and throughout Africa & SE Asia. Should we hold the US to a higher standard? Perhaps. But the cold war was the cold war (not that it makes it better, but it puts it in context).

I think the real problem wasn't so much the SOA, as much as a combination of SOA training PLUS a Marxist critique known as dependency theory, which gave rise to military dictatorships on the model of "Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism" (or BA). These BA regimes (the models were Brazil, Argentina, Chile) came from a belief that the nation-state needed to promote industrial growth, and that the military stood as a potential institution (ordered, disciplined, patriotic) to act in the interest of the nation (rather than be "political"). Basically, the same kind of movement pursued by the national-leftist aprista officers in Peru.

So. Essentially, just as the SOA was gearing up to train LA militaries, they were becoming more politicized, many taking training accute interest in managing their national economies. They learned how to be effective soldiers and defeat subversives from US officers; they learned to take over their national economies in the name of "national progress & unity" from neo-Marxist economists. Both well-meaning, both led to horrible consequences.

That's a very good point regarding the function of the military in Latin America and in the U.S.

The U.S. military is currently waging battle against foreign combatants in a foreign land, which is drastically different from their homeland (U.S.).

Latin American military, particulary in Bolivia and Colombia, are waging a civil war of sorts. The military who try to clear blockaded roads and eradicate illicit coca are the very people, who they are fighting against: mainly poor, indigenous individuals.

The military, as this book shows, is a way for these people to separate themselves and distance themselves from a population looked down upon.

The U.S. military has no recent history of fighting or controlling its own people, and is something that they may not understand the sociological aspect of the Latin Americans' "war".

What I find remarkable about Bolivia recently, is the strong opposition of the military to be used as a police force. Officers leading up to October & in the aftermath kept insisting that riot control was the police's job, not the military's.

Unfortunately, the unreliability of the police, coupled w/ Mesa's need to retain order, has once again pushed the Bolivian military into a police role.

But it's a good sign that the military specifically doesn't want to take on police functions. This is, in part, due to the current training w/ US at the new post-SOA that emphasises the military staying w/in its institutuional boundaries.

Does the eradication of coca fit within the military's duties?

If not, what else is there left to do? Perhaps, when and not if (as I think it is a matter of time), the cocalero movement begins to arm themselves with the help of outside groups, then maybe the military will have more duties.